

Internet of Things meets Hardware Cybersecurity

Serge Leef


Vice President and General Manager

- New Ventures
- System Level Engineering Division




IoT: Emergence of Intelligent Systems

- Intelligent Systems / Internet of Things
 - 75B Devices will be connected by 2020 (Morgan Stanley)
 - Execute native or cloud-based applications
 - Data collection & analytics
 - Explosive growth potential
- Internet of Things
 - Uniquely identified "things"
 - Machine-to-machine communication
 - Cloud infrastructure
 - Cyber-physical systems
- Edge-node design
 - Electronics, Controls, Software
 - Multi-physics, Communications






IoT Projected Market Size Generates Excitement






Embedded systems moving into IoT world



We used to believe that hardware is the "Root of Trust", but... not anymore



IoT World is Already Under Attack

Proofpoint Research: Internet of Things (IoT) Cyber Attack Security

in January 2014. Proofpoint researchers discovered proof of a much-theorized but never before seen internet of Trings (IoT) cyber-attack. Proofpoint has observed what we believe to be an industry first of devices, including some home appliances (TVs, a refrigerator), sending malicious email spain.

As our researchers were analyzing emailborne threats, they observed a recent cyber attack camplegn where more than 25 percent of the malicious email lover 750,000 messages) came from things that were not convertional laptop or desktop computers, but rather members of the Internet of Trings, a "Thingbot"-nes"



- From Dec 20rd through Jan 6th
 Three campaigns per day, approximately 100k emails per
- Over 450k unique IP addresses, over 100k were from foT devices

A more detailed examination suggested that while the majority of mail was initiated by "expected" lot devices such as compromised home-networking devices intuiters. NASI, there was a significant perferrage of attack mail coming from other non-traditional sources, such as connected multimedia centers, belevisions and all reads one refrigerator.

Additionally, observing the devices:

- A vast number of the devices are running embedded linux servers (usually busybox)
- . Some use mini-httpd, some apache
- Some are ARM devices, some are MIPS (or something very sinvlar) others are based on an empedded Reales chapset (for example, media players).
- · Some are believed to be game consoles.
- Some are NAS devices cone specific brand has open teiner, open sish and an SMTP server - all unsecurable)
- . Some set-top bayes were also seen as exploited

This proof of a systematic compromise of foT devices and its subsequent use of those Thingbots to further attack other networks is something we've never seen before. This suggests are unfortunate, future for both home users and enterprises, the latter of whom now faces an even larger volume of malicious affack capacity.


Worse, these compromised home appliances provide a mechanism where users can unknowingly expose their work environment to such cyber attacks. At a user has to do is use a remote RDP connection, or conceivably simply take an action like checking their hidge from their work PC. If a classic drive-by or even a redirect has been installed, the work PC is now compromised though this is arguably more farfatched). Clearly, as the trend towards smart devices and BYCO increases, the risk of enterprise exposure increases correspondingly, exponentially.





HP: Most IoT Devices Lack Security, Open To Attack

Thu, 07/31/2014 - 3:18pm




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A recent study from Hewlett-Packard reveals that 70 percent of Internet of Things (IoT) devices — including sensors and connected infrastructure — are seriously vulnerable to attack. The Internet of Things State of the Union Study from HP's Fortify on Demand division came about after hearing a lot about IoT, but saw nothing that focused on the complete picture of IoT security.



IoT Topology Coming into Focus and Edge Nodes are wide-open to attacks





Syrian Radar Case

"September 2007, Israeli jets bombed a suspected nuclear installation in northeastern Syria. Among the many mysteries still surrounding that strike was the failure of Syrian radar, supposedly state of the art, to warn the Syrian military of the incoming assault. It wasn't long before military and technology bloggers concluded that this was an incident of electronic warfare and not just any kind. Post after post speculated that the commercial off-the-shelf microprocessors in the Syrian radar might have been purposely fabricated with a hidden "backdoor" inside. By sending a preprogrammed code to those chips, an unknown antagonist had disrupted the chips' function and temporarily blocked the radar"

Source: IEEE spectrum, 2007





OIT TECH Talk - S. Leef - May 2015

Stuxnet Virus Likely Delivered by "Infected" USB Flash Drive



"Stuxnet, a 500-kilobyte computer worm that infected the software of at least 14 industrial sites in Iran"

IEEE, "The Real Story of Stuxnet", February 26, 2013



The "Candy Drop"



- Security firm hired to test data security of credit union
 - Scattered 20 infected USB flash drives in parking lot, picnic and smoking areas
 - 15 were plugged into company computers
 - Passwords, logins and other information were compromised
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security Test
 - USB flash drives scattered in government parking lots
 - 60% of those found were plugged into networked computers
 - 90% of those with official logos were plugged in



Source: Information Week, June 7, 2006 & Business Insider, July 24th 2013



Hardware Attack Types

'Side-Channel' Attacks - (SECRET EXTRACTION)





Counterfeit Chips - (SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITY)





■ Malicious Logic inside Chip - (TROJANS)



Side-Channel Attacks




To crack safes, it's essential to know how they work





DPA: Differential Power Analysis


- Thermal images can help in locating cryptographic circuits
 - Attempts to enter candidate keys should exercise crypto
 - This results in visible power dissipation



- Subsequently, different power dissipation patterns can be observed based on correct or incorrect key entry attempts
- Keys can then be inferred




Set-Top Boxes Side-Channel Attacks Delaying Time-to-Crack Is Measure of Success



Countermeasures for Side-Channel Attacks

- Decrease signal-to-noise ratio
- Incorporate randomness into cryptography
- Pre-charge registers and buses to mitigate power-leakage signatures
- Use fixed-time algorithms to reduce data-related timing signatures
- Camouflaging structures from reverse engineering




Lifecycle for a Single IC

JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) Case Study



Global nature of supply chain makes chain-of-custody unworkable



Component changes hands 15 times before final install



Counterfeit and recycled chips

More than a Backyard Industry!

















Sorted by size, similarity and lead count











Creating Secure Silicon in an Untrusted Environment — VPN for Silicon



Possible Activation Solution: Logic Encryption


- Add gates throughout a design connected to a key
 - Generate a 256 bit encryption key
 - Inject 256 gates throughout the design
 - Gates inserted are pre-determined by the bit in the key



- Manufacturing
 - Use potentially un-trustworthy fab
 - Place a 256 bit key in tamper-proof location in the design after fabrication
- Global key vs. unique key (PUFs)




What Are Hardware Trojans?



- Rogue hardware injected into the design/chip
 - Untrusted cores (design phase)
 - Untrusted fab (fab phase)
 - Triggered subsequently
 - Special date/time
 - Receipt of special signal
- Payload = Malicious Action
- Types of Attacks
 - Kill switch: Breaking the system
 - Backdoor: Gaining access to the system. e.g., sending confidential data off-chip

Threat Example




- Unpublished control message travels around the internet and is unrecognized and ignore by most routers
- When a router containing a hardware Trojan in the control plane sees such message, it takes action to re-direct data



Run-time Detection via Co-processor

- Co-processor for run-time Trojan detection
 - Include co-processor in the design as an IP block
- Issues targeted
 - Peripherals with hidden functionality
 - Prevention of undeclared communications





Countermeasures

Malicious Logic inside Chip (TROJANS)

Counterfeit Chips (SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITY)

'Side-Channel' Attacks *(SECRET EXTRACTION)*

Defenses against attempts to leak out secrets stored on the chip

- Use of hardened IP or altered design
- Simulation of attacks to identify weaknesses

Detection of overproduced, cloned re-marked, recycled or otherwise unauthorized IC's

- Authentication
- Activation

Design-time Detection


- Formal methods
- Algorithmic test

Run-time Detection

 Insertion of logic to monitor run time activity



Countermeasures Don't Need to Be Perfect



Summary



System design and integration take new forms with evolution and pervasiveness of cloud, sensors, social networking, gaming and mobility enabled by rapidly advancing silicon



A huge opportunity exists to combine all these technologies in intelligent ways to create high-value, domain-specific user experiences



Edge node security needs to be considered up-front



Graphics

www.mentor.com